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Surprise and Intelligence Failure 
by Douglas Porch and James J.Wirtz 
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Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 
Government. 
September 6, 2002 
Surprise is as old as warfare itself. The 
frequency of its occurrence in history, 
however, offers neither adequate warning 
nor consolation, especially when its effects 
can be so devastating. The events of 
September 11, 2001 proved especially 
shocking both because they were so 
destructive and because they were so 
unexpected. Yet, both the fact that the 
attack occurred and even the form it took 
should not have taken the United States 
completely unawares. Familiarity with 
terrorist methods, repeated attacks against 
U.S. facilities overseas, combined with indications that the continental United States was at the top of the 
terrorist target list might have alerted us that we were in peril of a significant attack. And yet, for reasons 
those who study intelligence failure will find familiar, 9/11 fits very much into the norm of surprise caused 
by a breakdown of intelligence warning. 
9/11 was especially traumatic because the "surprise" of the attack was linked to an extraordinarily 
destructive act of terrorism. Terrorists invariably seek out targets whose destruction will result in 
maximum psychological impact for at least two reasons. First, they believe that attacks on symbolic 
targets will have an influence far beyond their actual physical impact. Nineteenth century anarchists 
assassinated Russian czars and other high government officials in the belief that this would collapse the 
social structure and produce revolution. In 1954, Algerian revolutionaries believed erroneously that a few 
bombs placed in police stations and public buildings would ignite a Muslim insurrection against French 
colonialism. Timothy McVey calculated in April 1995 that the destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City would catalyze among the American people the same indignation that he felt 
over the intrusion of the government into the private lives of its citizens. 
It is difficult to know exactly what those Al Qaeda militants who flew airplanes into the Trade Towers and 
the Pentagon had in mind. At a minimum, the hijackers were carrying out the edicts of Osama bin Laden 
and his call to kill Americans "…wherever they existed." But the magnitude of the target and the 
destruction sought by the attackers suggest broader objectives. They were clearly attempting to influence 
U.S. public opinion and hence cause a reevaluation of American policy on a whole range of Middle 
Eastern issues. Many believe that they also hoped to undermine Arab governments in Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia that collaborated in a so-called unholy alliance with the United States. By attacking the skyscraper 
symbols of American capitalism, they also sought to punish Americans for the pursuit of what they saw as 
the Godless ways of Western culture. Al Qaeda might have even wanted to capitalize on the way high 
profile terrorist attacks usually provoke indignation followed by repression. They might have hoped that 
U.S. military action would create further Islamic militancy. Al Qaeda did manage to mobilize the American 
people and military against them and their Taliban supporters, but the Islamic world has not rallied to their 
call to battle. In fact, the attacks on 9/11 accelerated the decline of extremism in the Islamic world. 
Second, terrorists go after high profile targets because of their groups' relative weakness. Although 
terrorists assume that large numbers of people share their righteous anger and aspirations, in fact, they 
usually command few resources and even fewer followers. And in the wake of extraordinarily deadly 
terrorist attacks, they often lose the tacit support of fence sitters as people recoil from the loss of innocent 
life and what appears to be a senseless political agenda. U.S. intervention in Afghanistan demonstrated 
that the Al Qaeda militants collected there and their Taliban supporters had shallow roots in an Afghan 
population unwilling to defend them. Because they have little broad support, terrorists are forced out of 
weakness to fall back on headline 
grabbing actions coordinated by a 
handful of militant conspirators. 
Should the 9/11 attacks have taken us by 
surprise? In retrospect, indications that 
the United States in general and New 
York's Trade Towers in particular had 
been singled out for attack by the 
terrorists were abundant. Run-ins 
between U.S. Rangers and groups 
loosely affiliated with Al Qaeda occurred 
in Somalia in 1993. The Trade Towers 
were bombed by Moslem militants in 
1993, as were the Khobar Towers in 
Dahran, Saudi Arabia in July 1996. One 
unfortunate irony of the attacks in Dahran 
is that the continental United States and 
U.S. government facilities in third 
countries were perceived as "softer" 
targets by the terrorists after force 
protection measures were adopted by U.S. forces in the Middle East following the Khobar Towers 
bombing. Attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 were followed by that on the 
USS Cole in October 2000—evidence, if more were needed, of the seriousness of Osama bin Laden's 
declaration of war on America. In fact, the day before the 9/11 attack, the Congressional Research 
Service had published a report citing the links between bin Laden and Near Eastern terrorist groups. The 
fact that some of these attacks had been carried out by suicide bombers, repeating a pattern witnessed in 
the Israel-Palestine conflict, offered further proof that these terrorists were willing to resort to desperate 
measures. 
Al Qaeda Calling Card 
USS Cole October 2000 
Factors in Intelligence Failure 
The 9/11 attack on the Trade Towers has often been compared to that of the Japanese against Pearl 
Harbor as another infamous case of intelligence failure. On both occasions, there was ample evidence 
that the enemy might be pushed to undertake a desperate act. But the signs leading up to 9/11 were 
ignored for at least three of the same reasons that the Japanese were able to catch the U.S. Pacific fleet 
at anchor on the morning of 7 December, 1941—good intelligence indicators lost in the "noise" of 
disinformation; a belief that the enemy lacked the technical capacity to undertake the action; finally, mirror 
imaging, the assumption on the part of the intelligence "consumer" that the action undertaken was 
unlikely because it was "illogical." 
While in retrospect the footprint of a 
surprise attack becomes easy to trace, 
before the event it usually requires a 
great effort of foresight and intuition to 
cull out "good" information from a 
plethora of data. Relevant information 
may be filtered out as it is sent up the 
bureaucratic chain because it seems 
unimportant, trivial or irrelevant to more 
important concerns—such as local FBI 
agents reporting that Arab students in 
flight schools only wished to learn how to 
take off, not to land. "Noise" becomes a 
problem especially when intelligence 
services have overlapping mandates, are 
competitive and therefore fail to 
cooperate to share and analyze 
information, or believe that the other 
service has a special responsibility for 
the collection of a particular type of 
intelligence. It is now obvious that the 
inability of the CIA and the FBI to 
communicate at least contributed to the 
failure to detect the 9/11 attacks, as the 
failure of army and naval intelligence to cooperate aided the Pearl Harbor debacle. 
 
Pearl Harbor: Opening Moments  
Smoke rising from burning aircraft at Hickam Airfield can be 
seen in the distance; the Japanese quickly suppressed U.S. 
fighter opposition by attacking Oahu's airfields first. The shock 
wave from the detonation of an aerial torpedo can be seen 
spreading across Pearl Harbor and oil is already leaking from 
the USS Oklahoma. 
A second factor in intelligence surprise occurs when the technological capabilities of the enemy are 
underestimated. The United States discounted the ability of the Japanese Navy to project a fleet across 
the Pacific to launch an air attack with aerial torpedoes against U.S. ships. In fact, Pearl Harbor was 
inspired by the successful attack by Swordfish bi-planes launched from British carriers against the Italian 
fleet at Taranto. Despite this successful precedent, the United States Navy persisted in its belief that the 
Japanese Navy was incapable of orchestrating such an operationally and technologically sophisticated 
maneuver. Ironically, although the 9/11 conspirators demonstrated an organizational capacity to 
coordinate the simultaneously hijacking of four airliners, no one suspected that the hijackers' weapon of 
choice would be the box-cutter. 
The final cause of intelligence 
surprise is "mirror-imaging"—the 
belief that the perpetrators will not 
carry out a particular act because 
the defender, in their place, would 
not do it. It seemed inconceivable to 
the U.S. planners in 1941 that the 
Japanese would be so foolish to 
attack a power whose resources so 
exceeded those of Japan, thus 
virtually guaranteeing defeat. 
Likewise, the notion of "suicide 
bombing" is so alien to the 
American —indeed the Western—
outlook, that we find it difficult to 
fathom the mindset of enemies 
prepared to conceive of an 
operation of such horrific 
proportions, one in which they are 
 
July 4, 1997... About half of the U.S. carrier fleet is in this picture. 
Even the best intelligence cannot overcome vulnerabilities created 
by a peacetime mindset. 
prepared to immolate themselves in acts of fiery desperation. In fact, one of our interpretations of the 
events of 9/11 is that many of the hijackers did not realize that, by signing on to Osama bin Laden's 
desperate mission, they would be committing suicide. The fact that bin Laden and his henchmen were 
willing to use their own people in this way gives us insights into their megalomania and what life would be 
like in "bin Laden's world." 
Most Americans accept the notion that terrorist attacks against U.S. interests are bound to occur in the 
future, leading to a sense of insecurity and general anxiety. But widespread recognition that terrorism is 
possible helps reduce its likelihood by making intelligence analysts, law enforcement officers, government 
officials and average Americans more aware of their surroundings and more willing to follow up reports of 
suspicious behavior. Surprise often has this effect, especially when the costs of a lack of vigilance are so 
fresh in our minds.  
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Homeland Security & Terrorism Resources. 
 
